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A predictive model of terrorist activity is developed by examining the 
daily number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia from 1994 through 2007. The 
dynamic model employs a shot noise process to explain the self-exciting na-
ture of the terrorist activities. T his estimates the probability of future attacks 
as a function of the times since the past attacks. l n addition, the excess of 
nonattack days coupled with the presence of multiple coordinated attacks on 
the same day compeiJed the use of hurdle models to jointly model the prob-
ability of an attack day and corresponding number of attacks. A power law 
distribution whh a shot noise driven parameter best modeled the number of 
attacks on an attack day. £nterpretation of the model parameters is discussed 
and predictive performance of the models is evaluated. 
1. Introduction. Since the attacks of September 11 , 2001 there has been a 
substantial increase in the amount of resources dedicated to combating terrorism. 
As a single example, the Congressional Research Services estimates that as of 
September 2010 $1.2 trillion USD has been spent on the Global War on Tenor, 
including $28.5 billion USD on enhanced secmity [Belasco (2010)]. Despite this 
increase in spending, there are no accurate measures of the effectiveness of these 
counter-terrorism efforts [Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006), Per! (2007)]. Ac-
cording to the Congressional Research Service, one of the keys to combating ter-
rorism effectively is to understand, and have con ectly specified models for, terror-
ist activity: 
"Better understanding of the dynamics of terrorism allows for a more complete picture 
of the complexities involved in measuring success or failure and can assist the 11 Oth 
Congress as it coordinates, funds, and oversees anti-terrorism policy and programs" 
[Perl (2007) 1-
A dynamic model for tenm·ism should describe terrorist activity in a way that 
is consistent with both the theoretical framework for terrorism and the observed 
data. Defining accurate models of terrorist activity is important not just from the 
standpoint of assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism effotts but also for 
use as a tool to predict the future risk of terrorist attack. 
A majority of publications in the literature use one of three basic modeling ap-
proaches to tenorism. The work of Enders and Sandler (1993, 2000, 2002, 2006) 
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A predictive model of terrorist activity is developed by examining
the daily number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia from 1994 through
2007. The dynamic model employs a shot noise process to explain
the self-exciting nature of the terrorist activities. This estimates the
probability of future attacks as a function of the times since the past
attacks. In addition, the excess of nonattack days coupled with the
presence of multiple coordinated attacks on the same day compelled
the use of hurdle models to jointly model the probability of an attack
day and corresponding number of attacks. A power law distribution
with a shot noise driven parameter best modeled the number of at-
tacks on an attack day. Interpretation of the model parameters is
discussed and predictive performance of the models is evaluated.
1. Introduction. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 there has been
a substantial increase in the amount of resources dedicated to combating ter-
rorism. As a single example, the Congressional Research Services estimates
that as of September 2010 $1.2 trillion USD has been spent on the Global
War on Terror, including $28.5 billion USD on enhanced security [Belasco
(2010)]. Despite this increase in spending, there are no accurate measures of
the effectiveness of these counter-terrorism efforts [Lum, Kennedy and Sher-
ley (2006), Perl (2007)]. According to the Congressional Research Service,
one of the keys to combating terrorism effectively is to understand, and have
correctly specified models for, terrorist activity:
“Better understanding of the dynamics of terrorism allows for a more complete
picture of the complexities involved in measuring success or failure and can
assist the 110th Congress as it coordinates, funds, and oversees anti-terrorism
policy and programs” [Perl (2007)].
A dynamic model for terrorism should describe terrorist activity in a way
that is consistent with both the theoretical framework for terrorism and the
observed data. Defining accurate models of terrorist activity is important not
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just from the standpoint of assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism
efforts but also for use as a tool to predict the future risk of terrorist attack.
A majority of publications in the literature use one of three basic model-
ing approaches to terrorism. The work of Enders and Sandler (1993, 2000,
2002, 2006) and Barros (2003) uses time series analysis techniques including
intervention analysis and vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Other more
recent papers have applied group based trajectory analysis [Nagin (2005)] to
analyze terrorist data. Examples of this include LaFree, Morris and Dugan
(2010) who incorporate a zero-inflated Poisson distribution to account for an
excess of zero counts. Other approaches use Cox proportional hazards mod-
els to directly model the time between attacks [Dugan, LaFree and Piquero
(2005), LaFree, Dugan and Korte (2009)]. These last two papers attempt to
account for the recent event history as influencing current events by con-
structing an ad hoc term that describes the recent density of attacks. While
this is a step toward incorporating the dynamics related to the process his-
tory, it requires prespecification of the form of dependence.
The desire to include terms to account for recent event history is rooted
in the theoretical understanding of terrorism and other politically moti-
vated violence. The clustering hypothesis, concurrent with contagion theory
[Midlarsky (1978)], explains politically motivated violent activity as a se-
ries of nonindependent events, where each event influences the probability
of subsequent events. This hypothesis is well accepted in criminological and
sociological approaches to terrorism. Clustering effects and contagious be-
havior have been demonstrated in military coups [Li and Thompson (1975)],
international terrorism [Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980)], airline
hijackings [Holden (1986)], race riots [Myers (2000)] and insurgent activity
[Townsley, Johnson and Ratcliffe (2008)].
In examining terrorism data in general there are two major issues to
address. The first is that as terrorist attacks are usually rare, the daily num-
ber of terrorist attacks are often zero, but due to large coordinated attacks
there are some extreme values. This combination of a large number of zeros
and extreme values is poorly modeled by standard probability distributions.
Second, the timing of terrorist incidents appear to be clustered, rendering
standard models that assume independence unsuitable.
The first of these issues is addressed using a hurdle model [Mullahy
(1986)], also known as the two-part model [Heilbron (1994)]. The hurdle
model is a two component model that allows separate specifications of the
probability of a zero count and the probability of a nonzero count. This al-
lows the hurdle model to accommodate a large number of zeros in addition
to some extreme counts. The hurdle model is used in a variety of applica-
tions, including in ecology for modeling counts of rare species [Welsh et al.
(1996)], in public health for modeling smoking behavior [Jones (1994)], in
political science for modeling proportional representation in minority elec-
torates [Marschall, Ruhil and Shah (2010)] and network change detection
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[Heard et al. (2010)]. For terrorism modeling, the hurdle model is preferred
to the zero-inflated model [Lambert (1992)] which assumes that the extra ze-
ros observed are due to censoring. The hurdle model assumes that the extra
zeros are due to a separate process (the “hurdle”), which must be overcome
before the number of corresponding incidents are determined. This is more
reasonable for terrorism data, as it can often be assumed that sparsity of
attacks is because they are indeed rare, not because they are unobserved.
The second issue regarding the clustering behavior of terrorist activity is
addressed by incorporating a self-exciting component [Hawkes (1971)]. The
self-exciting component specifies that the probability of a event is a function
of the time (and possibly other aspects) of all previous events, such that the
effect on the probability decreases over time. This can help account for the
clustering and dynamic nature of terrorism. For example, Holden (1986,
1987) developed a self-exciting Poisson model that better represented the
dynamics of airline hijacking and Mohler et al. (2011) a self-exciting space–
time model for residential burglaries.
This paper combines these two concepts to examine the use of self-exciting
hurdle models for terrorist activity in Indonesia and Timor-Leste between
1994 and 2007. The hurdle component is modeled as a self-exciting Bernoulli
process where the form of self-excitation is dictated by the data. The nonzero
counts are modeled by an extreme value distribution with parameters that
are also a function of the event history. The corresponding self-exciting hur-
dle model is capable of making predictions and providing information about
the risk of terrorist activity without any additional covariate information
other than the event history. This capability is important as covariate infor-
mation for terrorism data is often either missing or unreliable.
2. Data and exploratory analysis. The Global Terrorism Database [La-
Free and Dugan (2007)] is an open-source publicly available database of
over 87,000 terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2008. The
database is continually updated with new information and is believed to be
the most comprehensive database of its kind. The data used here are a subset
of the GTD consisting of daily counts of terrorist attacks in Indonesia1 from
January 1, 1994 through December 31, 2007.
2.1. Exploratory data analysis. The data from a training period of 1994
through 2000 was examined to inform model construction. Of the 2,557 days
considered in this analysis, there were 250 terrorist attacks on 158 unique
event days. Figure 1, displaying the daily and semi-yearly counts of attacks,
illustrates the nature of the terrorist activity. In particular, the attacks ap-
pear clustered with long stretches between attacks followed by a period of in-
1This includes data from Timor-Leste (East Timor) which became a sovereign state in
2002.
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Fig. 1. Daily number of terrorist events in Indonesia. The histogram shows the cumula-
tive number of attacks in each six month period.
creased activity. In addition, while most days have no attacks (93.8%), some
days have multiple attacks (possibly due to planned coordinated attacks).
Table 1 shows the distribution of the observed attacks per day compared
to the expected values under a Poisson and negative binomial probability
distribution fitted with maximum likelihood. While the Poisson cannot cap-
ture any of the tail behavior, the negative binomial adapts better to the
tail distribution but consequently underestimates the number of days with
only 1 attack and overestimates the number of days with 2 and 3 attacks.
A chi-square goodness-of-fit test yields a p-value of 0.00016, suggesting that
Table 1
Distribution of observed and expected number of Indonesian terrorist attacks per day
(1994–2000)
# Attacks # Days Poisson Neg.Bin
0 2,399 2,319 2,401
1 130 227 103
2 16 11 31
3 7 0 12
4 1 0 5
>4 4 0 5
AIC – 1,988.0 1,481.8
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the negative binomial is not a sufficient model. In addition, the tail is com-
prised of several extreme values (36,11,10 and 6 attacks on a single day) that
exacerbate the general lack of fit. The large number of zeros coupled with
the presence of several extreme values necessitate more complex models.
Figure 1 also reveals the possibility that the attack days are clustered.
This is examined with Ripley’s K-function [Dixon (2002)]. The K-function
is a second-order function that can reveal if clustering (or inhibition) is
present in a point pattern. It is defined loosely as
K(t)∝ E[# of future events ≤ t from a randomly chosen event].
Because this measure will be effected by an inhomogeneous attack day proba-
bility, we estimate it [Baddeley, Møller and Waagepetersen (2000), Veen and
Schoenberg (2006)]:
Kˆ(t) = T−1
N∑
i=1
wi
pˆi
∑
j>i
1(tj − ti ≤ t)
pˆj
,
where T is the total observational time, pˆi is the estimated probability of
at least one attack at day ti, and wi is a one-sided edge correction. The
estimated probability is given by the model in (9) that includes trend and
seasonality components (i.e., model BL5 in Table 2; see Section 4).
Figure 2 plots Kˆ(t)− t which has expected value 0 if the estimated proba-
bilities are correct and there is no unaccounted for clustering. The observed
values fall well above the 95% pointwise confidence intervals (obtained from
a parametric bootstrap, 1,000 simulations), showing that the data display
clustering behavior not accounted for by the baseline model.
These characteristics of the terrorism data require flexible models that
can handle the temporal attack patterns, clustering, an excess of nonattack
days and the possibility of multiple coordinated attacks on the same day.
Self-exciting hurdle models are developed in the next section to represent
the complex nature of such terrorist activity.
3. Hurdle models and the self-exciting process.
3.1. Hurdle models. The hurdle models of Mullahy (1986) refer to a class
of two component models for discrete count data. These models assume
that two different processes drive the zero and nonzero counts, respectively.
The hurdle component of the model corresponds to the probability that the
count is nonzero (i.e., a terrorist action will occur), while the count com-
ponent corresponds to the distribution of positive counts (i.e., the number
of corresponding terrorist events). When the two components are combined,
the hurdle model produces a probability mass function on the nonnegative
integers. Additionally, the hurdle approach facilitates the use of two sim-
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Fig. 2. Plot of Kˆ(t)− t for Indonesian terrorism (1994–2000). The solid line is from the
baseline model (BL5) with the gray band showing the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles estimated
from 1,000 simulations. The dashed line is from the self-exciting model (SE1) presented
in Section 4.
pler models in place of one more complicated model. This will be especially
appealing in model fitting, as the likelihood may be separable, allowing for
independent evaluation of each component.
For modeling the daily counts of a terrorist process, let Yt be the number
of events on day t and Et be the indicator for an event day such that Et = 1
if Yt ≥ 1 (i.e., there is at least one terrorist attack on day t) and Et = 0 if
Yt = 0 (i.e., there are no attacks on day t). Also, let ti denote the ith event
day (not event, but day with at least one attack).
Letting Ht = {Ys : s ≤ t} be the internal history of the terrorist process,
the hurdle component is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable with hurdle
probability pt =Pr(Et = 1|Ht−1) specified conditionally on the past history
of the event process. A separate count model is constructed for Yt|Et = 1
with density ft(y) = Pr(Yt = y|Et = 1,Ht−1), for y ∈ {1,2, . . .}. Because the
count component is constructed conditionally on there being at least one
event, it will have no support on 0 [i.e., ft(0) = 0]. Combining the hurdle
and count components gives the full density
f∗t (y) = Pr(Yt = y|Ht−1) =
{
ft(y)pt, y > 0,
1− pt, y = 0.
(1)
This has a similar form to a zero-inflated model [Lambert (1992)] but
differs in that for the zero-inflated model Pr(Yt = 0|Ht−1) = (1 − pt)ft(0).
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Zero-inflated models usually arise when there is a random censoring pro-
cess that prevents observations at certain times. Alternatively, instead of
assuming that terrorist events occurred but were not observed, the hurdle
approach explicitly models the probability that no events occurred.
The log-likelihood for a hurdle model can be decomposed as the sum of
two terms logL= logL1 + logL2, where for T observations
logL1 =
T∑
t=1
Et log pt + (1−Et) log(1− pt),(2)
logL2 =
T∑
t=1
Et · log ft(yt)
(3)
=
∑
t :Et=1
log ft(yt).
The first term (in the form of a Bernoulli process) represents the hurdle
component and the second term is the usual sum for a set of observations
coming from the density ft and represents the number of events per event
day. The form of the likelihood is equivalent to a discrete time version of
a marked point process [Daley and Vere-Jones (2003)], where the marks are
the number of attacks on an event day. A particular benefit of this represen-
tation emerges when ft and pt share no common parameters, allowing their
log-likelihoods to be handled separately for parameter estimation.
3.2. Self-exciting process. It has been suggested that some terrorist pro-
cesses exhibit self-excitation or contagion behavior [Holden (1986), Dugan,
LaFree and Piquero (2005), LaFree, Dugan and Korte (2009)]. A self-exciting
point process [Hawkes (1971)] is one where the realization of events increases
the short-term probability of observing future events, much in the same
manner that one contagious individual can infect other individuals (while
they are still infectious) or how major earthquakes lead to aftershocks. This
type of model can be written in the form of a cluster process [Hawkes and
Oakes (1974)] and used to explain the apparent clustering of terrorist activ-
ities. Specifically, we consider a generalized shot noise process [Rice (1977)],
where the self-exciting component St ≥ 0 will be a nonnegative function of
the past history Ht−1 of the form
St =
∑
s<t
Esαsg(t− s)
(4)
=
∑
i : ti<t
αig(t− ti).
The magnitude parameter, αi, determines the influence that the ith event
day has on the self-exciting process. It may be a function of other associated
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information about the event day (e.g., number of events, number killed,
success indicator, group attribution). Based on the results of the exploratory
data analysis, we restrict our attention to the case where αi ≥ 0, although
inhibition effects could be obtained if negative values were permitted.
The decay function g(·) specifies the shape of the excitation based on
the time since the previous event days. To aid in parameter interpretation
and estimation, we specify g(·) to be a proper probability mass function
with strictly positive support such that g(u) ≥ 0, g(u) = 0 for u < 1, and∑∞
u=1 g(u) = 1. This ensures that the influence of an event will eventually
diminish and makes αi solely responsible for the magnitude of the effects
contributed by the ith event.
Any discrete distribution can be used for the decay function, provided its
support is limited to the set of positive integers. Standard distributions, like
Poisson or negative binomial, may require shifting or truncation to avoid
having support on zero. For example, the (mean specified) shifted negative
binomial is
g(u;µ, r) =
Γ(r+ u− 1)
Γ(r)(u− 1)!
(
r
µ− 1 + r
)r( µ− 1
µ− 1 + r
)u−1
,(5)
which has a mean of µ > 1, and size parameter r > 0. The corresponding
shifted geometric distribution is given by g(u;µ, r = 1) and the shifted Pois-
son density can be defined as the limiting case when r→∞.
Figure 3 shows the geometric and negative binomial decay functions along
with the shot noise processes corresponding to 8 event days. This illustrates
how the form of the shot noise process from (4) is similar to kernel inten-
sity estimation [Diggle (1985)], but with weights and one-sided (predictive)
kernels.
3.3. Self-exciting Bernoulli hurdle process. The event days, Et, are mod-
eled as a self-exciting Bernoulli process where the probability of an event
day is excited (increased) by the occurrence of previous events. Specifically,
we consider the hurdle probability on day t to be a function of the process
Xt =Bt + St,(6)
where Bt is a baseline process and St is the self-exciting component given
by (4). The baseline can be a function of any exogenous variables that could
have an effect on the process (e.g., social, political or economic conditions
and events, counter-terrorism efforts, etc.), but it will not include any infor-
mation coming from the internal history.
To ensure the hurdle probability pt ∈ [0,1], a transformation η(pt) =Xt is
used. If the baseline process is nonnegative (i.e., Bt ≥ 0), then Xt ≥ 0 and an
appealing transformation is η(p) =− log(1− p), corresponding to the hurdle
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Fig. 3. (a) and (b) show the decay functions for the shifted geometric (µ = 40) and
shifted negative binomial (µ= 40, r = 5), respectively. (c) and (d) show the corresponding
shot noise processes (solid lines) and scaled component kernels (dotted lines) for 8 events
with αi = α= 0.5.
probability
pt = 1− e
−Xt .(7)
While other transformations (e.g., logit) could be used, this one provides
several benefits. It enjoys a likelihood function that is computationally con-
venient, substituting (7) into (2) obtains the Bernoulli log-likelihood
logL1 =
∑
1≤ti≤T
log(eXti − 1)−
T∑
t=1
Xt.(8)
The shot noise component of the second sum (
∑T
t=1Xt =
∑T
t=1Bt+
∑T
t=1 St)
can be simplified by recognizing that
T∑
t=1
St =
∑
i : ti<T
αiG(T − ti),
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where G is the cumulative density function of g. This significantly reduces
computation, as it is only calculated for the event days and not over all days
in the observation window.
This transformation also allows for a straightforward interpretation of the
parameters in Xt. Notice that pt is also the probability that a Poisson ran-
dom variable with rate Xt is greater than 0. When events are rare and Xt
is small, Et can be modeled approximately by a Poisson distribution. Ac-
cording to the superposition property of the Poisson, the event days arise
from two sources, the baseline process with rate Bt and the shot noise pro-
cess with rate St. The rate from the shot noise can be further decomposed
into its elements αig(t− ti) for {i : ti < t}. Thus, under the Poisson approx-
imation, event day i will generate an expected
∑∞
u=1αig(u) = αi number of
additional event days and the decay function g(·) controls when the extra
event days will occur. While these interpretations will not hold exactly under
the Bernoulli model, they do provide an indication of how each component
effects the process.
3.4. Survival functions. This formulation for the hurdle process also pro-
vides simple expressions for some properties of the time until the next event
day. For a given time t0, let τ be the time of the next event day. The survival
function Vt0(u) = Pr(τ − t0 > u) gives the probability that the next event
day will be more than u days away. For the self-exciting hurdle process, this
becomes
Vt0(u) = Pr(Et0+1 =Et0+2 = · · ·=Et0+u = 0)
=
u∏
δ=1
(1− pt0+δ)
= exp
{
−
u∑
δ=1
Xt0+δ
}
for u ∈ {1,2, . . .}, where Xt0+δ is calculated assuming no new events have
occurred since t0. The survival function can be used to calculate the expected
time until the next event day
Et0 [τ ] = E[τ − t0] = 1+
∞∑
u=1
Vt0(u)
= 1+
∞∑
u=1
exp
{
−
u∑
δ=1
Xt0+δ
}
.
The survival function specification of this model can be useful for prediction,
and making inference about future attacks given the current history.
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4. Results. In order to build the models and evaluate their predictive
performance, the data are partitioned into two time periods. The first time
period from 1994 through 2000 is used to construct the models and estimate
their parameters. The second period from 2001 through 2007 is used to
assess the predictive performance of the models.
4.1. Event day modeling. Recall that the hurdle probability is construc-
ted from the sum of a baseline and self-exciting processes (6). In order to
capture potential seasonality and other large scale trends in the data, the
baseline process Bt is defined as
log(Bt) = β0 + β1t+ β2t
2 +A1 sin(2pit/ω) +A2 cos(2pit/ω),(9)
where the seasonal terms have a period of ω = 365.25 days. This results
in five baseline parameters θB = (β0, β1, β2,A1,A2) ∈R
5. The log transform
ensures Bt ≥ 0. We considered self-exciting processes of the form
St(α,µ, r) = α
∑
i : ti<t
g(t− ti;µ, r),(10)
where g(u;µ, r) is a shifted negative binomial decay function (5) and the
magnitude α is a constant. This results in three parameters for the self-
exciting component θS = (α,µ, r) ∈R
3
+.
The combined model for Xt = Bt + St results in up to 8 parameters to
estimate. Estimation is carried out by maximizing the log-likelihood func-
tion given in (8). Since there is no explicit solution available, we used R’s
numerical optimization routine nlminb [R Development Core Team (2011)]
to obtain estimates. For all models, the estimates converged within seconds
from a variety of starting points.
Table 2 shows the evaluated models and their corresponding AIC scores.
The lowest AIC belongs to the four component model with a constant base-
line (SE1), providing essentially a discrete time version of the Hawkes model
[Hawkes (1971), Ozaki (1979)]. This AIC is much lower than the best base-
line only model (BL5) which includes the periodic terms. Figure 2 plots the
weighted K-function for SE1 and BL5 showing the self-exciting model is
much tighter around 0 indicating a better fit over the baseline only model
[Diggle (1979)]. Figure 4 shows the estimated hurdle probability in the train-
ing period for both models.
The parameters of the self-exciting model (SE1) suggest a baseline hurdle
probability of about 0.012 when the shot noise term drops to zero. However,
according to the Poisson approximation, every event day will generate an ex-
pected α= 0.89 additional event days. The generated event day is expected
to occur in µ = 37.54 days, but the time until occurrence has a median of
only 16 days.
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Table 2
Parameter estimates for the event day models for the training period (1994–2000). The
BL are the baseline only and the SE are the self-exciting models
Model AIC β0 β1 β2 A1 A2 α µ r
BL1 1,187.77 −2.75
BL2 1,149.54 −8.2 8.05
BL3 1,151.25 −2.83 −8.01 11.91
BL4 1,171.22 −2.82 −0.42 −0.31
BL5 1,136.80 −8.02 7.69 −0.35 −0.32
BL6 1,138.60 −3.53 −5.74 9.95 −0.35 −0.32
SE1 1,075.21 −4.41 0.89 37.54 0.45
SE2 1,077.16 −5.17 1.23 0.87 36.55 0.45
SE3 1,078.71 15.31 −63.2 50.24 0.85 35.69 0.45
SE4 1,077.03 −4.34 −0.41 −0.40 0.86 38.55 0.44
SE5 1,078.76 −5.99 2.68 −0.38 −0.42 0.82 36.57 0.43
SE6 1,079.60 20.46 −79.33 62.91 −0.43 −0.45 0.80 37.28 0.43
4.2. Count modeling. It can be obtained from Table 1 that most event
days (92.4%) are comprised of only 1 or 2 attacks. However, several days
(1.9%) have more than 9 attacks (with one day having 36 recorded terrorist
attacks). This suggests count distributions that have an initial rapid decay,
Fig. 4. Hurdle probabilities for the best fitting self-exciting model SE1 (solid line), the
best fitting baseline only model BL5 (dotted line), and the observed piecewise constant
probabilities (blocks). The rug signifies the event days.
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but still possess a long tail to accommodate the extreme values. One such
discrete distribution is the Riemann zeta or discrete Pareto distribution.
This power law distribution has recently been employed to model the severity
(e.g., number killed or injured) of terrorist attacks [Clauset, Young and
Gleditsch (2007)].
Using it to model the event day counts, under an i.i.d assumption, gives
the probability mass function
ft(y; s) =
y−s
ζ(s)
, y ∈ {1,2, . . .},
where ζ(s) =
∑∞
x=1 x
−s is the Riemann zeta function and the parameter
s ∈ (1,∞). This one parameter model is easy to estimate numerically via
maximum likelihood [Goldstein, Morris and Yen (2004), Seal (1952)] by
finding the s that satisfies the equation 1
n
∑n
i=1 log(yi) =−
ζ′(s)
ζ(s) . The training
period data gives rise to an estimated parameter of sˆ= 2.86. The bootstrap
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009) gives a p-
value of 0.69, suggesting the zeta distribution provides a suitable fit.
While the constant parameter zeta distribution appears to provide a good
fit, there may be better models, especially if the distribution is allowed to
vary over time. In particular, as for the hurdle component, distributions
that vary over time in response to a shot noise process are considered. An
additional driving process (with shot noise) was implemented for the count
model, namely,
Xct (β
c, αc, µc) = βc + αc
∑
i : ti<t
Yi · g
c(t− ti;µ
c),
where βc is a constant baseline, αci = α
c · Yi varies in response to the num-
ber of attacks on the ith event day, and the decay function gc(u;µc) is the
one parameter shifted geometric function with mean µc. This results in three
parameters for the count component θC = (β
c, αc, µc). Note that this is a sep-
arate process than the one specified for the hurdle component given by (9)
and (10). The additional flexibility afforded by the hurdle specification al-
lows such additional complexity to be introduced for the count component
of the model.
There are two primary hypotheses about how the count distribution be-
haves in response to the event history. First, counts could respond in a self-
exciting manner, where recent event and multi-event days increase the like-
lihood of further multi-event days. Alternatively, due to the depletion of
resources or increased anti-terrorism measures after large attacks, counts
may respond in a more self-inhibiting manner, where recent multi-event
days lower the chances of multi-events day in the near future.
To evaluate the self-exciting hypothesis, let st = (1−e
−Xc
t )−1 since smaller
values of s lead to more mass on the extreme values. Alternatively, st = e
Xc
t
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Table 3
Parameter estimates for the count models for the training period (1994–2000). Cz , Cse
and Csi are the constant parameter, self-exciting and self-inhibiting forms, respectively,
of the Riemann zeta distribution
Model AIC s β α µ
Cz 241.00 2.86
Cse 240.48 (1− e
−Xt)−1 0.375 0.20 2.13
Csi 244.72 e
Xt 1.00 0.34 55.18
for the self-inhibiting model. Table 3 shows the estimated parameters and
AIC scores for the fitted count models. The lower AIC suggests that the
self-exciting count model has more validity than the self-inhibiting model
for the training data. Figure 5 shows the estimated probability of counts
under the constant parameter (Cz) and self-exciting (Cse) models. While
the self-exciting model puts more mass on multi-event days when Xct is
large, the decay is rapid and the self-exciting behavior is short lived—only
for a few days, before the shot noise term approaches 0 and its effects become
negligible.
4.3. Testing model predictions. Based on the training period, models are
selected and fit for both the hurdle and count components. To evaluate how
Fig. 5. Estimated count probabilities for the constant parameter model (Cz with s= 2.86)
and for the self-exciting count model (Cse) at the baseline state (s= 3.19) and most excited
state (s= 1.75).
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well this can predict future terrorist activity, the models are applied to
the terrorist incidents in the testing period (2001–2007) using the following
procedure:
(1) At day t predict the probability of an event day and conditional num-
ber of attacks on day t+ 1, based on the current history Ht.
(2) Observe Yt+1 and re-estimate the model parameters based on the
updated history Ht+1.
(3) Repeat steps (1) and (2) through the testing period to construct a fi-
nal model based on all data between 1994–2007.
This update and forecast scheme results in a set of daily predictions pˆt =
Pr(Et = 1|Ht−1) and fˆt(y) = Pr(Yt = y|Et = 1,Ht−1) conditioned on the past
history of the process.
The predictive capability of the models are evaluated by comparing the
log probability gain, or predictive log-likelihood ratio, of each model [Daley
and Vere-Jones (2004)]. This score is a relative measure of the improvement
in predicative capability for a model compared to a reference or null model.
The interpretation is that values greater than 0 show a relative improvement
in predictions over the reference model, with the highest values indicating
the preferred model.
For the hurdle component, the log probability gain is
G=
∑
t∈T2
Et log
pˆt
pˆit
+ (1−Et) log
1− pˆt
1− pˆit
,
where pˆt comes from the model of interest and pˆit from the constant baseline
only model (BL1), and T2 = [01 Jan 2001, 31 Dec 2007] covers the testing
period. Table 4 compares the log probability gains G and the AIC scores
from the training period, and shows that the results from the test period
were similar to those in the training period, supporting the use of AIC for
model selection.
Table 4
The hurdle component log probability score, G, using the constant baseline only model
(BL1) as the reference model. The AIC scores are from the training period (see Table 2)
Model AIC G Model AIC G
BL1 1,187.77 0.00 SE1 1,075.21 26.96
BL2 1,149.54 −19.10 SE2 1,077.16 25.47
BL3 1,151.25 20.69 SE3 1,078.71 24.96
BL4 1,171.22 −1.39 SE4 1,077.03 26.22
BL5 1,136.80 −18.21 SE5 1,078.76 24.56
BL6 1,138.60 21.63 SE6 1,079.60 24.57
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Table 5
The count component log probability score, Gc,
using the constant parameter zeta model (Cz)
as the reference model
Cs Cse Csi
Gc 0.00 8.07 −0.27
The constant baseline self-exciting model (SE1) has the largest log prob-
ability gain and all self-exciting models outperform all of the baseline only
models. The best baseline only model for the testing period was the full
model with seasonality and a quadratic trend (BL6). This is in contrast to
the training period results where the best baseline only model had a lin-
ear trend (BL5). The linear trend model failed to perform as well during
the testing period, as the general attack rate peaked around the transition
point and started decreasing during the remainder of the testing period,
creating a significant quadratic trend over the combined observation period.
Alternatively, the self-exciting models can adapt rapidly to sudden changes
in attack rate, yielding better overall predictive ability.
The count component uses the log probability gain score
Gc =
∑
i : ti∈T2
log
fˆ(yi)
hˆ(yi)
,
where fˆ is the model of interest and hˆ is the reference model. Table 5
shows the values of Gc using the constant parameter zeta model (Cz) as the
reference model. These results show the self-exciting zeta model (Cse) as the
preferred model for predicting the counts. As with the hurdle component,
the predictive performance of the count models followed the AIC scores from
the training period. However, the model with the self-exciting component
does predict substantially better than the constant component model—more
so than would be expected from the AIC scores in the training period (see
Table 3). This may be due to changes in the attack behavior during the
testing period. Figure 1 shows that while there were a few large counts during
2001, there were very few multi-attack days after. This change in the pattern
of multiple attacks accounts for the improved predictive capabilities of the
self-exciting model over the constant parameter model. The self-exciting
count model is able to quickly adapt to changing conditions and consequently
makes better predictions.
In summary, the daily counts of Indonesian terrorist attacks were mod-
eled with a self-exciting hurdle model. The separation of the model into
two components allowed both the attack rate and attack characteristics to
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be more faithfully represented. It was found that including a self-exciting
process benefited both the hurdle and count components by allowing the
models to quickly adapt to changing attack behavior. It is this property as
a predictive tool that makes the self-exciting hurdle model especially useful
in an applied setting where prediction is of primary interest.
5. Conclusion. In practice, policy makers are faced with limited resources,
financially, materially and in personnel. The allocation of these resources
depends on an understanding of the future risk of terrorist activity. As an
example, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, policy makers
placed additional security in the form of National Guard troops in all US
commercial airports. This was done in hopes of re-establishing public trust
in the safety of air travel while the intelligence community was assessing the
risk of subsequent attacks [Price and Forrest (2009)]. The obvious question
in that case was when to shift resources from increased airport security to
investing in long-term strategies to improve intelligence capabilities. As this
case illustrates, only by clearly understanding the risk of terrorist activity
can policy makers make informed decisions about allocating resources.
This paper presents a two-component self-exciting model for the analysis
and prediction of future terrorist activity. It was found that the best model
used a constant baseline with a self-exciting term for the hurdle component
and a Riemann zeta distribution with shot noise driven parameter for the
count component. The improvement offered by the self-exciting term pro-
vides support for the contagion theory and suggests a significant short term
increase in terrorism risk after an attack. The use of a power law distribution
for the number of same day attacks corresponds with the power law behav-
ior of the number killed in terrorist attacks [Clauset, Young and Gleditsch
(2007)]. This is to be expected, as multiple coordinated attacks would tend
to indicate better planned, and hence more severe, terrorist activities.
The self-exciting hurdle model adheres to the theoretical concept for a con-
tagion effect to terrorism as manifested in the clustering of data while pro-
viding good fit and predictive capabilities without relying on exogenous
variables. The model provides a simple structure and interpretation of the
parameters useful for understanding the dynamic nature of the terrorist ac-
tivity. This provides an appropriate staring point for exploring additional
covariate effects, including analysis concerning the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism activities, geography, political or economical factors. As the attack
clustering may be partially attributable to a stochastic baseline driven by
such exogenous processes [Holden (1986)], further analysis could include co-
variates in the baseline model (9) to test the impact on the self-exciting
component.
By focusing on the timing of terrorist attacks on the islands of Indonesia,
other aspects of the attacks, such as location, attack type and group respon-
sible, were not considered. Including such additional information could lead
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to more detailed models that better explain the nuances of the terrorist ac-
tivity. For example, the self-exciting component could include a spatial prox-
imity term using the models of Mohler et al. (2011) or multiple self-exciting
terms could be included that represent how attacks from one terrorist group
influence the subsequent attacks of other groups.
The utility of the models presented here and their ease of implementation
and interpretation make them a potentially useful tool in security related
fields. The results show that the risk of terrorist activity can vary greatly
over short periods of time, thus policy responses in terms of resource alloca-
tion, security and counter-terrorism responses should reflect this as well as
addressing the more long-term trends in risk. For example, understanding
the short-term variations in risk would allow a more effective deployment and
assessment of additional airport security measures in the wake of a terrorist
attack, while a grasp of the longer term trends could help guide the develop-
ment and assessment of more strategic counter-terrorism resources, such as
increasing the number of foreign language experts available for translation
or developing effective de-radicalization programs to prevent the growth of
terrorist groups.
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SELF-EXCITING HURDLE MODELS FOR TERRORIST
ACTIVITY
By Michael D. Porter and Gentry White
GeoEye Analytics
The University of Queensland
A predictive model of terrorist activity is developed by examining
the daily number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia from 1994 through
2007. The dynamic model employs a shot noise process to explain
the self-exciting nature of the terrorist activities. This estimates the
probability of future attacks as a function of the times since the past
attacks. In addition, the excess of non-attack days coupled with the
presence of multiple coordinated attacks on the same day compelled
the use of hurdle models to jointly model the probability of an attack
day and corresponding number of attacks. A power law distribution
with a shot noise driven parameter best modeled the number of at-
tacks on an attack day. Interpretation of the model parameters is
discussed and predictive performance of the models is evaluated.
1. Introduction. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 there has
been a substantial increase in the amount of resources dedicated to com-
bating terrorism. As a single example, the Congressional Research Services
estimates that as of September 2010 $1.2 trillion USD has been spent on
the Global War on Terror, including $28.5 billion USD on enhanced secu-
rity (Belasco, 2010). Despite this increase in spending there are no accurate
measures of the effectiveness of these counter-terrorism efforts (Lum C. and
Sherley, 2006; Perl, 2007). According to the Congressional Research Service,
one of the keys to combating terrorism effectively is to understand, and have
correctly specified models for, terrorist activity
“Better understanding of the dynamics of terrorism allows for a more complete
picture of the complexities involved in measuring success or failure and can
assist the 110th Congress as it coordinates, funds, and oversees anti-terrorism
policy and programs” Perl (2007).
A dynamic model for terrorism should describe terrorist activity in a way
that is consistent with both the theoretical framework for terrorism and the
observed data. Defining accurate models of terrorist activity is important not
AMS 2000 subject classifications: Primary, ; secondary
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just from the standpoint of assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism
efforts but also for use as a tool to predict the future risk of terrorist attack.
A majority of publications in the literature use one of three basic model-
ing approaches to terrorism. The work of Enders and Sandler (1993, 2000,
2002, 2006), and Barros (2003) uses time series analysis techniques includ-
ing intervention analysis and vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Other
more recent papers have applied group based trajectory analysis (Nagin,
2005) to analyze terrorist data. Examples of this include LaFree, Morris and
Dugan (2010) who incorporate a zero-inflated Poisson distribution to ac-
count for an excess of zero counts. Other approaches use Cox proportional
hazards models to directly model the time between attacks (Dugan, LaFree
and Piquero, 2005; LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009). These last two papers
attempt to account for the recent event history as influencing current events
by constructing an ad hoc term that describes the recent density of attacks.
While this is a step toward incorporating the dynamics related to the process
history, it requires prespecification of the form of dependence.
The desire to include terms to account for recent event history is rooted
in the theoretical understanding of terrorism and other politically moti-
vated violence. The clustering hypothesis, concurrent with contagion theory
(Midlarsky, 1978), explains politically motivated violent activity as a series
of non-independent events, where each event influences the probability of
subsequent events. This hypothesis is well accepted in criminological and
sociological approaches to terrorism. Clustering effects and contagious be-
havior have been demonstrated in military coups (Li and Thompson, 1975),
international terrorism (Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida, 1980), airline
hijackings (Holden, 1986), race riots (Myers, 2000), and insurgent activity
(Townsley, Johnson and Ratcliffe, 2008).
In examining terrorism data in general there are two major issues to
address. The first is that as terrorist attacks are usually rare, the daily num-
ber of terrorist attacks are often zero, but due to large coordinated attacks
there are some extreme values. This combination of a large number of zeros
and extreme values is poorly modeled by standard probability distributions.
Second, the timing of terrorist incidents appear to be clustered, rendering
standard models that assume independence unsuitable.
The first of these issues is addressed using a hurdle model (Mullahy, 1986),
also known as the two-part model (Heilbron, 1994). The hurdle model is a
two component model that allows a separate specifications of the probability
of a zero count and the probability of a non-zero count. This allows the hurdle
model to accommodate a large number of zeros in addition to some extreme
counts. The hurdle model is used in a variety of applications, including in
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ecology for modeling counts of rare species (Welsh et al., 1996), in pub-
lic health for modeling smoking behavior (Jones, 1994), in political science
for modeling proportional representation in minority electorates (Marschall,
Ruhil and Shah, 2010), and network change detection (Heard et al., 2010).
For terrorism modeling, the hurdle model is preferred to the zero-inflated
model (Lambert, 1992) which assumes that the extra zeros observed are due
to censoring. The hurdle model assumes that the extra zeros are due to a
separate process (the “hurdle”), which most be overcome before the num-
ber of corresponding incidents are determined. This is more reasonable for
terrorism data as it can often be assumed that sparsity of attacks is because
they are indeed rare, not because they are unobserved.
The second issue regarding the clustering behavior of terrorist activity is
addressed by incorporating a self-exciting component (Hawkes, 1971). The
self-exciting component specifies that the probability of a event is a function
of the time (and possibly other aspects) of all previous events, such that the
effect on the probability decreases over time. This can help account for the
clustering and dynamic nature of terrorism. For example, Holden (1986,
1987) developed a self-exciting Poisson model that better represented the
dynamics of airline hijacking and Mohler et al. (2011) a self-exciting space-
time model for residential burglaries.
This paper combines these two concepts to examine the use of self-exciting
hurdle models for terrorist activity in Indonesia and Timor-Leste between
1994 and 2007. The hurdle component is modeled as a self-exciting Bernoulli
process where the form of self-excitation is dictated by the data. The non-
zero counts are modeled by an extreme value distribution with parameters
that are also a function of the event history. The corresponding self-exciting
hurdle model is capable of making predictions and providing information
about the risk of terrorist activity without any additional covariate infor-
mation other than the event history. This capability is important as covariate
information for terrorism data is often either missing or unreliable.
2. Data and Exploratory Analysis. The Global Terrorism Database
(LaFree and Dugan, 2007) is an open-source publicly available database of
over 87,000 terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2008. The
database is continually updated with new information and is believed to be
the most comprehensive database of its kind. The data used here are a subset
of the GTD consisting of daily counts of terrorist attacks in Indonesia1 from
January 1, 1994 through December 31, 2007.
1This includes data from Timor-Leste (East Timor) which became an sovereign state
in 2002.
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2.1. Exploratory Data Analysis. The data from a training period of 1994
through 2000 was examined to inform model construction. Of the 2557 days
considered in this analysis, there were 250 terrorist attacks on 158 unique
event days. Figure 1, displaying the daily and semi-yearly counts of attacks,
illustrates the nature of the terrorist activity. In particular, the attacks ap-
pear clustered with long stretches between attacks followed by a period of
increased activity. In addition, while most days have no attacks (93.8%),
some days have multiple attacks (possibly due to planned coordinated at-
tacks).
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Fig 1: Daily number of terrorist events in Indonesia. The histogram shows
the cumulative number of attacks in each six month period.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the observed attacks per day compared
to the expected values under a Poisson and negative binomial probability
distribution fitted with maximum likelihood. While the Poisson cannot cap-
ture any of the tail behavior, the negative binomial adapts better to the tail
distribution but consequently underestimates the number days with only 1
attack and overestimates the number of days with 2 and 3 attacks. A chi-
square goodness-of-fit test yields a p-value of 0.00016 suggesting that the
negative binomial is not a sufficient model. In addition, the tail is comprised
of several extreme values (36,11,10, and 6 attacks on a single day) that ex-
acerbate the general lack of fit. The large number of zeros coupled with the
presence of several extreme values necessitate more complex models.
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Table 1
Distribution of observed and expected number of Indonesian terrorist attacks per day
(1994-2000).
# Attacks # Days Poisson Neg.Bin
0 2399 2319 2401
1 130 227 103
2 16 11 31
3 7 0 12
4 1 0 5
>4 4 0 5
AIC - 1988.0 1481.8
Figure 1 also reveals the possibility that the attack days are clustered.
This is examined with Ripley’s K-function (Dixon, 2002). The K-function
is a second order function that can reveal if clustering (or inhibition) is
present in a point pattern. It is defined loosely as
K(t) ∝ E[# of future events ≤ t from a randomly chosen event]
Because this measure will be effected by an inhomogeneous attack day prob-
ability, we estimate it (Baddeley, Møller and Waagepetersen, 2000; Veen and
Schoenberg, 2006)
Kˆ(t) = T−1
N∑
i=1
wi
pˆi
∑
j>i
1(tj − ti ≤ t)
pˆj
where T is the total observational time, pˆi is the estimated probability of
at least one attack at day ti, and wi is a one-sided edge correction. The
estimated probability is given by the model in (9) that includes trend and
seasonality components (i.e model BL5 in Table 2).
Figure 2 plots Kˆ(t)− t which has expected value 0 if the estimated proba-
bilities are correct and there is no unaccounted for clustering. The observed
values fall well above the 95% pointwise confidence intervals (obtained from
a parametric bootstrap, 1000 simulations) showing that the data display
clustering behavior not accounted for by the baseline model.
These characteristics of the terrorism data require flexible models that
can handle the temporal attack patterns, clustering, an excess of non-attack
days, and the possibility of multiple coordinated attacks on the same day.
Self-exciting hurdle models are developed in the next section to represent
the complex nature of such terrorist activity.
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Fig 2: Plot of Kˆ(t)− t for Indonesian terrorism (1994-2000). The solid line
is from the baseline model (BL5) with the gray band showing the 0.025 and
0.975 quantiles estimated from 1000 simulations. The dashed line is from
the self-exciting model (SE1) presented in Section 4.
3. Hurdle Models and the Self-Exciting Process.
3.1. Hurdle Models. The hurdle models of Mullahy (1986) refer to a class
of two component models for discrete count data. These models assume
that two different processes drive the zero and non-zero counts respectively.
The hurdle component of the model corresponds to the probability that the
count is non-zero (i.e. a terrorist action will occur), while the count com-
ponent corresponds to the distribution of positive counts (i.e. the number
of corresponding terrorist events). When the two components are combined,
the hurdle model produces a probability mass function on the non-negative
integers. Additionally, the hurdle approach facilitates the use of two sim-
pler models in place of one more complicated model. This will be especially
appealing in model fitting as the likelihood may be separable, allowing for
independent evaluation of each component.
For modeling the daily counts of a terrorist process, let Yt be the number
of events on day t and Et be the indicator for an event day such that Et = 1
if Yt ≥ 1 (i.e there is at least one terrorist attack on day t) and Et = 0 if
Yt = 0 (i.e. there are no attacks on day t). Also, let ti denote the i
th event
day (not event, but day with at least one attack).
Letting Ht = {Ys : s ≤ t} be the internal history of the terrorist process,
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the hurdle component is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable with hurdle
probability pt = Pr(Et = 1|Ht−1) specified conditionally on the past history
of the event process. A separate count model is constructed for Yt|Et = 1
with density ft(y) = Pr(Yt = y|Et = 1,Ht−1), for y ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Because
the count component is constructed conditionally on there being at least one
event, it will have no support on 0 (i.e. ft(0) = 0). Combining the hurdle
and count components gives the full density
f∗t (y) = Pr(Yt = y|Ht−1) =
{
ft(y)pt y > 0
1− pt y = 0
(1)
This has a similar form to a zero-inflated model (Lambert, 1992) but dif-
fers in that for the zero-inflated model Pr(Yt = 0|Ht−1) = (1 − pt)ft(0).
Zero-inflated models usually arise when there is a random censoring pro-
cess that prevents observations at certain times. Alternatively, instead of
assuming that terrorist events occurred but were not observed, the hurdle
approach explicitly models the probability that no events occurred.
The log-likelihood for a hurdle model can be decomposed as the sum of
two terms logL = logL1 + logL2, where for T observations
logL1 =
T∑
t=1
Et log pt + (1− Et) log(1− pt)(2)
logL2 =
T∑
t=1
Et · log ft(yt)
=
∑
t:Et=1
log ft(yt)
(3)
The first term (in the form of a Bernoulli process) represents the hurdle
component and the second term is the usual sum for a set of observations
coming from the density ft and represents the number of events per event
day. The form of the likelihood is equivalent to a discrete time version of a
marked point process (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2003) where the marks are the
number of attacks on an event day. A particular benefit of this representation
emerges when ft and pt share no common parameters allowing their log-
likelihoods to be handled separately for parameter estimation.
3.2. Self-exciting Process. It has been suggested (Holden (1986); Dugan,
LaFree and Piquero (2005); LaFree, Dugan and Korte (2009)), that some ter-
rorist processes exhibit self-excitation or contagion behavior. A self-exciting
point process (Hawkes, 1971) is one where the realization of events increase
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the short-term probability of observing future events, much in the same
manner that one contagious individual can infect other individuals (while
they are still infectious) or how major earthquakes lead to aftershocks. This
type of model can be written in the form of a cluster process (Hawkes and
Oakes, 1974) and used to explain the apparent clustering of terrorist activ-
ities. Specifically we consider a generalized shot noise process (Rice, 1977),
where the self-exciting component St ≥ 0 will be a non-negative function of
the past history Ht−1 of the form:
St =
∑
s<t
Esαsg(t− s)
=
∑
i:ti<t
αi g(t− ti)
(4)
The magnitude parameter, αi determines the influence that the i
th event
day has on the self-exciting process. It may be a function of other associated
information about the event day (e.g. number of events, number killed, suc-
cess indicator, group attribution). Based on the results of the exploratory
data analysis we restrict our attention to the case where αi ≥ 0, although
inhibition effects could be obtained if negative values were permitted.
The decay function g(·) specifies the shape of the excitation based on
the time since the previous event days. To aid in parameter interpretation
and estimation, we specify g(·) to be a proper probability mass function
with strictly positive support such that g(u) ≥ 0, g(u) = 0 for u < 1, and∑∞
u=1 g(u) = 1. This ensures that the influence of an event will eventually
diminish and makes αi solely responsible for the magnitude of the effects
contributed by the ith event.
Any discrete distribution can be used for the decay function provided its
support is limited to the set of positive integers. Standard distributions, like
Poisson or negative binomial, may require shifting or truncation to avoid
having support on zero. For example, the (mean specified) shifted negative
binomial is
g(u;µ, r) =
Γ(r + u− 1)
Γ(r) (u− 1)!
(
r
µ− 1 + r
)r ( µ− 1
µ− 1 + r
)u−1
(5)
which has a mean of µ > 1, and size parameter r > 0. The corresponding
shifted geometric distribution is given by g(u;µ, r = 1) and the shifted
Poisson density can be defined as the limiting case when r →∞.
Figure 3 shows the geometric and negative binomial decay functions along
with the shot noise processes corresponding to 8 event days. This illustrates
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how the form of the shot noise process from (4) is similar to kernel inten-
sity estimation (Diggle, 1985), but with weights and one-sided (predictive)
kernels.
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Fig 3: (a) and (b) show the decay functions for the shifted geometric (µ = 40)
and shifted negative binomial (µ = 40, r = 5) respectively. (c) and (d) show
the corresponding shot noise processes (solid lines) and scaled component
kernels (dotted lines) for 8 events with αi = α = 0.5.
3.3. Self-Exciting Bernoulli Hurdle Process. The event days, Et are mod-
eled as a self-exciting Bernoulli process where the probability of an event
day is excited (increased) by the occurrence of previous events. Specifically,
we consider the hurdle probability on day t to be a function of the process
Xt = Bt + St(6)
where Bt is a baseline process and St is the self-exciting component given
by (4). The baseline can be a function of any exogenous variables that could
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have an effect on the process (e.g. social, political or economic conditions
and events, counter-terrorism efforts, etc.), but it will not include any infor-
mation coming from the internal history.
To ensure the hurdle probability pt ∈ [0, 1], a transformation η(pt) = Xt
is used. If the baseline process is non-negative (i.e. Bt ≥ 0), then Xt ≥ 0
and an appealing transformation is η(p) = − log(1−p) corresponding to the
hurdle probability
pt = 1− e−Xt .(7)
While other transformations (e.g. logit) could be used, this one provides
several benefits. It enjoys a likelihood function that is computationally con-
venient, substituting (7) into (2) obtains the Bernoulli log-likelihood
logL1 =
∑
1≤ti≤T
log(eXti − 1)−
T∑
t=1
Xt.(8)
The shot noise component of the second sum
(∑T
t=1Xt =
∑T
t=1Bt +
∑T
t=1 St
)
can be simplified by recognizing that
T∑
t=1
St =
∑
i:ti<T
αiG(T − ti)
where G is the cumulative density function of g. This significantly reduces
computation as it is only calculated for the event days and not over all days
in the observation window.
This transformation also allows for a straightforward interpretation of the
parameters in Xt. Notice that pt is also the probability that a Poisson ran-
dom variable with rate Xt is greater than 0. When events are rare and Xt is
small, Et can be modeled approximately by a Poisson distribution. Accord-
ing to the superposition property of the Poisson, the event days arise from
two sources, the baseline process with rate Bt and the shot noise process
with rate St. The rate from the shot noise can be further decomposed into
its elements αig(t − ti) for {i : ti < t}. Thus, under the Poisson approxi-
mation, event day i will generate an expected
∑∞
u=1 αig(u) = αi number of
additional event days and the decay function g(·) controls when the extra
event days will occur. While these interpretations will not hold exactly under
the Bernoulli model, they do provide an indication of how each component
effects the process.
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3.4. Survival Functions. This formulation for the hurdle process also
provides simple expressions for some properties of the time until the next
event day. For a given time t0, let τ be the time of the next event day. The
survival function Vt0(u) = Pr(τ − t0 > u) gives the probability that the
next event day will be more than u days away. For the self-exciting hurdle
process, this becomes
Vt0(u) = Pr(Et0+1 = Et0+2 = . . . = Et0+u = 0)
=
u∏
δ=1
(1− pt0+δ)
= exp
{
−
u∑
δ=1
Xt0+δ
}
for u ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, where Xt0+δ is calculated assuming no new events have
occurred since t0. The survival function can be used to calculate the expected
time until the next event day
Et0 [τ ] = E[τ − t0] = 1 +
∞∑
u=1
Vt0(u)
= 1 +
∞∑
u=1
exp
{
−
u∑
δ=1
Xt0+δ
}
.
The survival function specification of this model can be useful for prediction,
and making inference about future attacks given the current history.
4. Results. In order to build the models and evaluate their predictive
performance the data are partitioned into two time periods. The first time
period from 1994 through 2000 is used to construct the models and estimate
their parameters. The second period from 2001 through 2007 is used to
assess the predictive performance of the models.
4.1. Event Day Modeling. Recall that the hurdle probability is constructed
from the sum of a baseline and self-exciting processes (6). In order to capture
potential seasonality and other large scale trends in the data the baseline
process Bt is defined as
log(Bt) = β0 + β1t+ β2t
2 +A1 sin(2pit/ω) +A2 cos(2pit/ω).(9)
where the seasonal terms have a period of ω = 365.25 days. This results in
five baseline parameters θB = (β0, β1, β2, A1, A2) ∈ R5. The log transform
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Table 2
Parameter estimates for the event day models for the training period (1994-2000). The
BL are the baseline only and the SE are the self-exciting models.
Model AIC β0 β1 β2 A1 A2 α µ r
BL1 1187.77 -2.75
BL2 1149.54 -8.2 8.05
BL3 1151.25 -2.83 -8.01 11.91
BL4 1171.22 -2.82 -0.42 -0.31
BL5 1136.80 -8.02 7.69 -0.35 -0.32
BL6 1138.60 -3.53 -5.74 9.95 -0.35 -0.32
SE1 1075.21 -4.41 0.89 37.54 0.45
SE2 1077.16 -5.17 1.23 0.87 36.55 0.45
SE3 1078.71 15.31 -63.2 50.24 0.85 35.69 0.45
SE4 1077.03 -4.34 -0.41 -0.40 0.86 38.55 0.44
SE5 1078.76 -5.99 2.68 -0.38 -0.42 0.82 36.57 0.43
SE6 1079.60 20.46 -79.33 62.91 -0.43 -0.45 0.80 37.28 0.43
ensures Bt ≥ 0. We considered self-exciting processes of the form
St(α, µ, r) = α
∑
i:ti<t
g(t− ti;µ, r)(10)
where g(u;µ, r) is a shifted negative binomial decay function (5) and the
magnitude α is a constant. This results in three parameters for the self-
exciting component θS = (α, µ, r) ∈ R3+.
The combined model for Xt = Bt + St results in up to 8 parameters to
estimate. Estimation is carried out by maximizing the log-likelihood func-
tion given in (8). Since there is no explicit solution available, we used R’s
numerical optimization routine nlminb (R Development Core Team, 2011)
to obtain estimates. For all models, the estimates converged within seconds
from a variety of starting points.
Table 2 shows the evaluated models and their corresponding AIC scores.
The lowest AIC belongs to the four component model with a constant base-
line (SE1), providing essentially a discrete time version of the Hawkes model
(Hawkes, 1971; Ozaki, 1979). This AIC is much lower than the best base-
line only model (BL5) which includes the periodic terms. Figure 2 plots the
weighted K-function for SE1 and BL5 showing the self-exciting model is
much tighter around 0 indicating a better fit over the baseline only model
(Diggle, 1979). Figure 4 shows the estimated hurdle probability in the train-
ing period for both models.
The parameters of the self-exciting model (SE1) suggest a baseline hurdle
probability of about 0.012 when the shot noise term drops to zero. However,
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Fig 4: Hurdle probabilities for the best fitting self-exciting model SE1 (solid
line), the best fitting baseline only model BL5 (dotted line), and the observed
piecewise constant probabilities (blocks). The rug signifies the event days.
according to the Poisson approximation, every event day will generates an
expected α = 0.89 additional event days. The generated event day is ex-
pected to occur in µ = 37.54 days, but the time until occurrence has a
median of only 16 days.
4.2. Count Modeling. It can be obtained from Table 1 that most event
days (92.4%) are comprised of only 1 or 2 attacks. However, several days
(1.9%) have more than 9 attacks (with one day having 36 recorded terrorist
attacks). This suggests count distributions that have an initial rapid decay,
but still possess a long tail to accommodate the extreme values. One such
discrete distribution is the Riemann zeta or discrete Pareto distribution.
This power law distribution has recently been employed to model the sever-
ity (e.g. number killed or injured) of terrorist attacks (Clauset, Young and
Gleditsch, 2007).
Using it to model the event day counts, under an i.i.d assumption, gives
the probability mass function
ft(y; s) =
y−s
ζ(s)
y ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
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where ζ(s) =
∑∞
x=1 x
−s is the Riemann zeta function and the parameter
s ∈ (1,∞). This one parameter model is easy to estimate numerically via
maximum likelihood (Seal, 1952; Goldstein, Morris and Yen, 2004) by find-
ing the s that satisfies the equation 1n
∑n
i=1 log(yi) = − ζ
′(s)
ζ(s) . The training
period data gives rise to an estimated parameter of sˆ = 2.86. The bootstrap
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009) gives a
p-value of 0.69, suggesting the zeta distribution provides a suitable fit.
While the constant parameter zeta distribution appears to provide a good
fit, there may be better models especially if the distribution is allowed to
vary over time. In particular, as for the hurdle component, distributions
that vary over time in response to a shot noise process are considered. An
additional driving process (with shot noise) was implemented for the count
model, namely
Xct (β
c, αc, µc) = βc + αc
∑
i:ti<t
Yi · gc(t− ti;µc)
where βc is a constant baseline, αci = α
c ·Yi varies in response to the number
of attacks on the ith event day, and the decay function gc(u;µc) is the one
parameter shifted geometric function with mean µc. This results in three
parameters for the count component θC = (β
c, αc, µc). Note that this is a
separate process than the one specified for the hurdle component given by
(9) and (10). The additional flexibility afforded by the hurdle specification
allows such additional complexity to be introduced for the count component
of the model.
There are two primary hypotheses about how the count distribution be-
haves in response to the event history. First, counts could respond in a
self-exciting manner, where recent event and multi-event days increase the
likelihood of further multi-event days. Alternatively, due to the depletion
of resources or increased anti-terrorism measures after large attacks, counts
may respond in a more self-inhibiting manner, where recent multi-event days
lower the chances of multi-events day in the near future.
To evaluate the self-exciting hypothesis, let st = (1−e−Xct )−1 since smaller
values of s lead to more mass on the extreme values. Alternatively, st = e
Xct
for the self-inhibiting model. Table 3 shows the estimated parameters and
AIC scores for the fitted count models. The lower AIC suggests that the
self-exciting count model has more validity than the self-inhibiting model
for the training data. Figure 5 shows the estimated probability of counts
under the constant parameter (Cz) and self-exciting (Cse) models. While
the self-exciting model puts more mass on multi-event days when Xct is
large, the decay is rapid and the self-exciting behavior is short lived - only
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Table 3
Parameter estimates for the count models for the training period (1994-2000). Cz, Cse,
and Csi are the constant parameter, self-exciting, and self-inhibiting forms (respectively)
of the Riemann zeta distribution.
Model AIC s β α µ
Cz 241.00 2.86
Cse 240.48 (1− e−Xt)−1 0.375 0.20 2.13
Csi 244.72 e
Xt 1.00 0.34 55.18
for a few days, before the shot noise term approaches 0 and its effects become
negligible.
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Fig 5: Estimated count probabilities for the constant parameter model (Cz
with s = 2.86) and for the self-exciting count model (Cse) at the baseline
state (s = 3.19) and most excited state (s = 1.75).
4.3. Testing Model Predictions. Based on the training period, models
are selected and fit for both the hurdle and count components. To evaluate
how well this can predict future terrorist activity, the models are applied to
the terrorist incidents in the testing period (2001-2007) using the following
procedure.
1. At day t predict the probability of an event day and conditional num-
ber of attacks on day t+ 1, based on the current history Ht.
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Table 4
The hurdle component log probability score, G using the constant baseline only model
(BL1) as the reference model. The AIC scores are from the training period (see Table 2).
Model AIC G Model AIC G
BL1 1187.77 0.00 SE1 1075.21 26.96
BL2 1149.54 -19.10 SE2 1077.16 25.47
BL3 1151.25 20.69 SE3 1078.71 24.96
BL4 1171.22 -1.39 SE4 1077.03 26.22
BL5 1136.80 -18.21 SE5 1078.76 24.56
BL6 1138.60 21.63 SE6 1079.60 24.57
2. Observe Yt+1 and re-estimate the model parameters based on the up-
dated history Ht+1.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 through the testing period to construct a final
model based on all data between 1994-2007.
This update and forecast scheme results in a set of daily predictions pˆt =
Pr(Et = 1|Ht−1) and fˆt(y) = Pr(Yt = y|Et = 1,Ht−1) conditioned on the
past history of the process.
The predictive capability of the models are evaluated by comparing the
log probability gain, or predictive log-likelihood ratio, of each model (Daley
and Vere-Jones, 2004). This score is a relative measure of the improvement
in predicative capability for a model compared to a reference or null model.
The interpretation is that values greater than 0 show a relative improvement
in predictions over the reference model, with the highest values indicating
the preferred model.
For the hurdle component, the log probability gain is
G =
∑
t∈T2
Et log
pˆt
pˆit
+ (1− Et) log 1− pˆt
1− pˆit
where pˆt comes from the model of interest and pˆit from the constant baseline
only model (BL1), and T2 =[01 Jan 2001, 31 Dec 2007] covers the testing
period. Table 4 compares the log probability gains G and the AIC scores
from the training period, and shows that the results from the test period
were similar to those in the training period, supporting the use of AIC for
model selection.
The constant baseline self-exciting model (SE1) has the largest log prob-
ability gain and all self-exciting models out-perform all of the baseline only
models. The best baseline only model for the testing period was the full
model with seasonality and a quadratic trend (BL6). This is in contrast to
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Table 5
The count component log probability score, Gc using the constant parameter zeta model
(Cz) as the reference model.
Cs Cse Csi
Gc 0.00 8.07 -0.27
the the training period results where best baseline only model had a lin-
ear trend (BL5). The linear trend model failed to perform as well during
the testing period as the general attack rate peaked around the transition
point and started to decreasing during the remainder of the testing period
creating a significant quadratic trend over the combined observation period.
Alternatively, the self-exciting models can adapt rapidly to sudden changes
in attack rate yielding better overall predictive ability.
The count component uses the log probability gain score
Gc =
∑
i:ti∈T2
log
fˆ(yi)
hˆ(yi)
where fˆ is the model of interest and hˆ is the reference model. Table 5 shows
the values of Gc using the constant parameter zeta model (Cz) as the ref-
erence model. These results show the self-exciting zeta model (Cse) as the
preferred model for predicting the counts. As with the hurdle component,
the predictive performance of the count models followed the AIC scores from
the training period. However, the model with self-exciting component does
predict substantially better than the constant component model - more so
than would be expected from the AIC scores in the training period (see Ta-
ble 3). This may be due to changes in the attack behavior during the testing
period. Figure 1 shows that while there were a few large counts during 2001,
there were very few multi-attack days after. This change in the pattern of
multiple attacks accounts for the improved predictive capabilities of the self-
exciting model over the constant parameter model. The self-exciting count
model is able to quickly adapt to changing conditions and consequently make
better predictions.
In summary, the daily counts of Indonesian terrorist attacks were mod-
eled with a self-exciting hurdle model. The separation of the model into
two components allowed both the attack rate and attack characteristics to
be more faithfully represented. It was found that including a self-exciting
process benefited both the hurdle and count components by allowing the
models to quickly adapt to changing attack behavior. It is this property as
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a predictive tool that makes the self-exciting hurdle model especially useful
in an applied setting where prediction is of primary interest.
5. Conclusion. In practice, policy makers are faced with limited re-
sources, financially, materially and in personnel. The allocation of these re-
sources depends on an understanding of the future risk of terrorist activity.
As an example, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, policy mak-
ers placed additional security in the form of National Guard troops in all US
commercial airports. This was done in hopes of re-establishing public trust
in the safety of air travel while the intelligence community was assessing the
risk of subsequent attacks (Price and Forrest, 2009). The obvious question
in that case was when to shift resources from increased airport security to
investing in long-term strategies to improve intelligence capabilities. As this
case illustrates, only by clearly understanding the risk of terrorist activity
can policy makers make informed decisions about allocating resources.
This paper presents a two-component self-exciting model for the analysis
and prediction of future terrorist activity. It was found that the best model
used a constant baseline with self-exciting term for the hurdle component
and a Riemann zeta distribution with shot noise driven parameter for the
count component. The improvement offered by the self-exciting term pro-
vides support for the contagion theory and suggests a significant short term
increase in terrorism risk after an attack. The use of a power law distribution
for the number of same day attacks corresponds with the power law behav-
ior of the number killed in terrorist attacks (Clauset, Young and Gleditsch,
2007). This is to be expected as multiple coordinated attacks would tend to
indicate better planned, and hence more severe, terrorist activities.
The self-exciting hurdle model adheres to the theoretical concept for a
contagion effect to terrorism as manifested in the clustering of data while
providing good fit and predictive capabilities without relying on exogenous
variables. The model provides a simple structure and interpretation of the
parameters useful for understanding the dynamic nature of the terrorist ac-
tivity. This provides an appropriate staring point for exploring additional
covariate effects, including analysis concerning the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism activities, geography, political, or economical factors. As the attack
clustering may be partially attributable to a stochastic baseline driven by
such exogenous processes (Holden, 1986), further analysis could include co-
variates in the baseline model (9) to test the impact on the self-exciting
component.
By focusing on the timing of terrorist attacks on the islands of Indonesia,
other aspects of the attacks, such as location, attack type, and group re-
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sponsible, was not considered. Including such additional information could
lead to more detailed models that better explain the nuances of the ter-
rorist activity. For example, the self-exciting component could include a
spatial proximity term using the models of Mohler et al. (2011) or multiple
self-exciting terms could be included that represent how attacks from one
terrorist group influence the subsequent attacks of other groups.
The utility of the models presented here and their ease of implementation
and interpretation make them a potentially useful tool in security related
fields. The results show that the risk of terrorist activity can vary greatly
over short periods of time, thus policy responses in terms of resource alloca-
tion, security, and counter-terrorism responses should reflect this as well as
addressing the more long-term trends in risk. For example, understanding
the short-term variations in risk would allow a more effective deployment and
assessment of additional airport security measures in the wake of a terrorist
attack, while a grasp of the longer term trends could help guide the develop-
ment and assessment of more strategic counter-terrorism resources, such as
increasing the number of foreign language experts available for translation
or developing effective de-radicalization programs to prevent the growth of
terrorist groups.
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